British history, as exemplified in Joss Marsh's Word Crimes. Word Crimes is both an innovative work of literary and legal history and an example of how class-conscious analysis can illuminate the dilemmas inherent in regulating the manner of speech. Word Crimes brings to light the curious and largely neglected history of prosecutions for blasphemy in nineteenthcentury England, 2 but its story is relevant to current American attempts to regulate offensive speech as well.
Most readers will no doubt share her surprise that so many prosecutions could take place in an era commonly associated with the growth of secularism. 3 Marsh explains this apparent paradox, however, by pointing to class conflict. In Word Crimes, Marsh argues for recognition of blasphemy as a "class crime of language" (p. 8); in doing so, she takes nineteenthcentury blasphemy out of its normal position as a cul-de-sac on the road to freedom of speech. However, to say Word Crimes is simply about blasphemy prosecutions is to underestimate the richness of theory and observation that Marsh presents. Marsh's work also takes the literary history of censorship into the nineteenth century, 4 revealing the crucial impact of literary strategies of "encoding, indirection, and strategic compensatory maneuvers" (p. 12) on the development of the Victorian novel and its characteristic employment of euphemism. Along the way, Marsh provides fascinating new information about the blaspheming predecessors of Dickens (pp. 51-60), the interwoven legal and literary worlds of Victorian England (pp. 94-98), and Thomas Hardy's concern with blasphemy (pp. 269-319). This Book Note, however, concentrates on Marsh's class-based description of blasphemy as an aspect of legal history with continuing relevance today.' While space limitations make this selection necessary, it also must be kept in mind that Word Crimes was not written primarily as a work of legal history and that this focus necessarily overlooks many of the insights Marsh offers.
I
Marsh identifies three waves of blasphemy prosecutions that correspond to periods of heightened class tension in England. The first took place between 1817 and 1825, when the publishers William Hone and Richard Carlile, along with the "volunteers" who managed Carlile's London print shop during his incarceration, were tried. These trials coincided with the era of the Peterloo protests, named after the 1819 march [Vol. 109: 155 in Manchester at which unarmed working-class protesters were killed by the local constabulary. 6 A second wave occurred in the early 1840s, during which Henry Hetherington, the Chartist leader, and Jacob Holyoake and Charles Southwell, secularist journalists, were tried.
This wave corresponded to the early years of Chartism, the largely working-class movement that demanded the passage of a Charter that included universal male suffrage and annual parliaments. 7 Finally, a third wave in the mid1880s included the trials of Charles Bradlaugh, England's first openly atheistic Member of Parliament, and George Foote, Bradlaugh's successor as president of the National Secular Society. These trials were contemporaneous with the agitation before the third reform bill of 1884, which extended working-class suffrage. In Marsh's narrative, the fates of blasphemy and political radicalism, influenced by the French Revolution and the writings of Thomas Paine, were closely entwined. The unrepentant blasphemers placed themselves in "a distinct tradition of conscious protest.., that stretches back to 1817 and beyond into the 1790s" (p. 6).s
All of these stories culminate in the trial Marsh selects as the central subject of her study: the 1883 blasphemy prosecution of George Foote, editor of the Freethinker, an avowedly secularist publication that prominently featured "Comic Bible" cartoons. Foote was brought to trial three times through private prosecutions for criminal blasphemy. He was convicted and sentenced to a year of hard labor in Holloway Gaol. In his defense, Foote pointed to Matthew Arnold, T.H. Huxley, John Stuart Mill, and other upper-class doubters whose religious skepticism had not resulted in prosecutions for blasphemy. Lord Chief Justice Coleridge, in the third and most famous trial, summarily rejected Foote's arguments, finding "a difference not only in degree, but in kind and nature. There is a grave and earnest tone, a reverent-perhaps I might even say a religious-spirit about the very attacks on Christianity itself which we find in the authors referred to ... ." 9 Coleridge then wrote the distinction between matter and manner into the law of England, proclaiming: "I now lay it down as law, that, if the decencies of controversy are observed, even the fundamentals of religion may be attacked without the writer being guilty of blasphemy." "0 Coleridge's new definition of blasphemy was not without precedent. In 1841, a parliamentary commission had reported that application of the penal law against blasphemers was largely reserved for cases in which "insulting language is used." "1 Similarly, in the 1841 blasphemy case against Henry Hetherington, Chief Justice Denman instructed the jury that:
[The question of blasphemy] must be, in a great degree, a question as to the tone, and style, and spirit, in which such enquiries are conducted.... [E]ven discussions upon [the great doctrines of Christianity] may be by no means a matter of criminal prosecution, but, if they be carried on in a sober and temperate and decent style, even those discussions may be tolerated, and may take place without criminality attaching to them: but that, if the tone and spirit is that of offence, and insult, and ridicule... the jury will hardly feel that the indictments are undeserved.
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Against this backdrop, Coleridge merely codified what had already emerged as practice in the law of blasphemy, namely, that the important element in the offense was not the denial of church doctrine but rather the style in which such opinions were expressed.
By focusing on manner, Coleridge's definition of blasphemy inevitably implicated class, just as his own opinion sought to separate out the upperclass skeptics from the defendants at bar. Foote himself argued that "[blasphemy is simply skepticism expressed in plain language and sold at the people's price" (p. 127). Marsh notes that "the theoretical equality of all men before the law breaks down when the crime in question is a crime of words, language, style" (p. 159). Perhaps not coincidentally, this transformation of the law of blasphemy from a crime of substance into one of style occurred at a time when accents in spoken language were increasingly interpreted as markers of social status. Beginning in the late eighteenth century and continuing into the nineteenth century, ideas of "proper" spoken English hardened. As one commentator noted, by 1881, "H, in speech, is an unmistakable mark of class distinction in England, as every person soon discovers." 13 As speech became the primary evidence of class membership, blasphemy's legal definition as a crime of linguistic style was inextricably linked to class identity.
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The judicial condemnation of blasphemy was also based on the potential for social unrest. Prosecutors pointed to the influence of blasphemy on unsuspecting members of the lower classes. Blasphemy was defined as that which was "calculated to mislead the ignorant and unwary" (p. 84). Marsh's evidence clearly demonstrates an upper-class desire to control the flow of viewpoints to the lower classes. Outrageous speech was thought to be dangerous when it appeared to be directed at members of the lower classes. "What would your feelings be if you found such a paper had been put into the hands of your offspring and domestics?" demanded Attorney-General Gifford in one blasphemy prosecution (p. 62)." 4 The use of a term such as "half-pay," for example, was thought to be indicative of incendiary intent not because of any intrinsic content, but rather because it would be readily understandable to a lower-class audience familiar with the practice of placing soldiers on half-pay during peacetime (p. 118). Similarly, the price of an allegedly offensive work was used as a gauge of its intended audience, and works priced in pence were subjected to far more searching scrutiny than those priced in guineas. Underlying this paternalism was the fear of revolution; as Marsh writes, "[Flear of insurrection inflated the charges of coarse 'grossness' and vulgar 'brutality' to produce a belief in the potential and even actual revolutionary 'violence' of plain speech" (p. 75).
II
Despite the fact that Word Crimes is first and foremost a work of literary history, Marsh's deployment of evidence is, at times, disconcerting to the legal historian. For a work that purports to center on a single case, Word Crimes is curiously indifferent to the legal record of the case itself. Marsh does not dwell upon the legal opinion that is the centerpiece of her work; indeed, Coleridge's reasoning in Regina v. Ramsay and Foote, aside from the manner/matter distinction, is left unanalyzed. Instead, Marsh's main sources are pamphlets and memoirs.
Oddly enough, if class analysis is one of the main strengths of Word Crimes, it is also the book's Achilles heel. For historical background, Marsh relies heavily on the scholarship of a previous generation of cultural Marxist scholars who placed class (and class consciousness) at the center of historical progress. 5 As a result, Marsh tends to dismiss non-class-based motivations for blasphemy. In a work dealing with the crime of blasphemy, religious belief gets shockingly short shrift: Nineteenth-century blasphemers who were motivated largely by non-Anglican religious convictions are labeled "religious extremists" and explicitly excluded from Marsh's study (pp. 13-14); statements of religious belief in working-class periodicals are disregarded as "quasi-Christian" (p. 87).
Class is troublesome in a number of other ways as well. Marsh tends to overlook the problems raised by the uncertain relationship between class language and "reality." Recent historians have tended to examine class as a discursive formation rather than as a simple socioeconomic category. As summarized by social historian David Cannadine, the events of the years covered in Word Crimes are not best described as "'[t]he making of class', be it the middle class or the working class .... What was going on was an unprecedentedly agitated discussion of social structure .. 16 Had Marsh acknowledged the tensions between class as rhetoric and class as reality, her account would have been richer and more convincing. Instead, she takes for granted the existence of classes, even when her own evidence resists simple class divisions based on a tripartite model. [Vol. 109: 155 today's efforts to define the parameters of permissible regulation of speech in the United States. At first glance, however, it is difficult to see how such efforts might relate to nineteenth-century English blasphemy law.' 8 Blasphemy and the issue of class bias in the law seem quite different from our current regime of speech regulation. Blasphemy has scarcely figured in American law, 9 despite a scattering of nineteenth-century cases in which it was found to be a common-law crime applicable in the United States as well as England.' Class, meanwhile, rarely enters the ambit of legal discussion. When class is discussed, it is often considered a proxy for (or a complication of) race. But, considered as analogy, the history of blasphemy can reveal ways in which class persists as a hidden presence in the law of speech governing both obscenity and hate speech. 2 ' Some caveats are in order here. I do not argue that a simple, tripartite class structure captures the social complexity of contemporary America. Nor do I mean to suggest that hate speech is an integral part of working-class identity.. However, the manner of communication still serves as a class marker. For this reason, the striking similarities between 'the justifications advanced in nineteenthcentury British blasphemy prosecutions and those put forth for modem speech regulation in the area of hate speech reveal the potential for disparate impact across classes in contemporary hate-speech regulation. This possibility exists on at least two levels: First, individuals of lower socioeconomic status may be charged under such laws at a disproportionate rate; second, unconscious class biases may influence judges to treat offenders with greater severity because of a perception that such language crimes are lower class in nature. Whether such bias exists is extremely difficult to know, as the class status of defendants is almost never described explicitly and can only be guessed at through such markers as language. But the difficulty of even formulating the questions reinforces the point that discussion of class is effaced in American legal thought.
Obscenity cases are an area in which the analogy to blasphemy is relatively clear. Foote's most obvious modem successor would seem to be Andres Serrano, the photographer whose picture of a crucifix immersed in urine ignited public controversy in 1989. Foote's "Comic Bible" cartoons offended through, among other things, their depiction of the naked rear end of God (p. 142). In the United States, obscenity has been configured as a conflict between youth culture and tradition ("a sept[uajgenerian in Tuscaloosa and a teenager in Las Vegas" 2), or between the artistic avantgarde and community-based standards of decency (" [a] vant-garde artistes... remain free to 9pater les bourgeois" 23). By locating the conflict as one taking place between different aesthetic philosophies, class is removed from the equation; indeed, the avant-garde can be seen as resisting social classification along with other forms of conventionality. But the Court is still willing to apply standards like those used in class-biased blasphemy trials. In NEA v. Finley, for example, the Court upholds use of "decency" as a standard in making administrative decisions. 4 Rather than protecting the "matter" or the belief being expressed, the Court left Congress free to regulate the manner of its expression. Just as the "Comic Bible" cartoons were thought to be so far beyond the realm of good taste that they could be left legally unprotected, so too was Serrano's Piss Christ.
However, it is actually in the realm of hate-speech regulations that the analogy to blasphemy is at its most unsettling. Like the rationales advanced by blasphemy courts of the nineteenth century, hate-speech decisions have focused on the manner of the speech in question. [Vol. 109: 155
In a second parallel, hate-speech regulation is routinely justified by the threat of violent disorder, much like the threat of social insurrection supposedly stanched by blasphemy prosecution. In Wisconsin v. Mitchell" the Court found that hate speech was "more likely to provoke retaliatory actions.., and incite community unrest." 3 ' In R.A. V. Justice Stevens pointed to the risk of riot, although he joined the Court in overturning Robert Viktora's conviction for burning a cross on an African-American family's lawn. 32 Stevens compared such conduct to burning trash near an ammunition dump. 33 He glumly reminded his brethren, "One need look no further than the recent social unrest in the Nation's cities to see that racebased threats may cause more harm to society and individuals than other threats." ' While its concern for preventing race riots is laudable, the Court's reliance on the specter of unrest has uncomfortable parallels with the history of prosecutions for blasphemy. 35 These parallels should suggest something more than the repetitiveness of history. They also reflect the degree to which the class implications of speech regulation are absent from American legal thought. We think to ask if the young are disproportionately represented among convicted hate criminals, 36 but not if the poor might be similarly affected. We may suspect that such laws weigh more heavily on the Robert Viktoras of the world rather than on the authors of The Bell Curve, 37 but we know little of why that might be so. Justice Blackmun dubs offenders "hoodlums," ' but still we do not ask if class bias, conscious or unconscious, might help explain his reasoning. While the elaborate class consciousness of nineteenthcentury England may seem distant and unattractive, reviewing its history reminds us that language and class are intimately related. We need to question whether packaging racism in the wrapping of expensive editions exempts it from prosecution in the late twentieth century, just as the
